Reliability vs. Credibility: Understanding What Your Informant Actually Knows
By James Porter | NW Tactical Methods
“This CI has given us five search warrants. I trust him.” I understand what the investigator means when I hear a statement like that. The source has produced. Information has checked out. Search warrants have been successful. Maybe guns, drugs, wanted persons, or other evidence have been recovered because of information that source provided. But I would still change the language.
We don’t trust a source.
A better statement is: This CI has demonstrated reliability in the past, and based on what we know right now, I believe the information being provided is sufficiently reliable to continue investigating.That distinction may sound minor, but I believe it is fundamental to confidential informant management. Past reliability matters. It should matter. What it cannot do is replace our responsibility to evaluate the information being provided today. A reliable source can provide bad information. An unproven source can provide accurate information. Our job as handlers is to understand the difference and do the investigative work necessary to determine what we actually know.
Reliability Is Built, Not Assigned
When a new source begins working with law enforcement, we have very little history from which to evaluate them. They may claim to know drug dealers, violent offenders, locations, criminal organizations, or people with outstanding warrants. Those claims are information—not proof of reliability.
This is where the initial debrief becomes important. If someone claims familiarity with controlled substances, for example, there may be appropriate ways to assess whether that claimed knowledge is legitimate. If they identify people involved in criminal activity, portions of what they tell us may be compared against police reports, records, investigative databases, open-source information, or information already known to investigators. As the source continues working, that history grows. Information is verified or disproven. Investigative leads develop. Operations succeed or fail. The source demonstrates whether they follow direction, whether they provide timely information, and whether what they tell investigators consistently survives independent scrutiny.
I think of this history as the source’s “CI Resume.”
A normal resume tells us what someone claims to have done. A CI resume should tell us what the investigative record demonstrates they have done. What information did they provide? What was independently corroborated? What resulted in enforcement action? What turned out to be inaccurate? Were there significant inconsistencies? Were there lies? That history should follow the source throughout the relationship. Reliability should not become a permanent label assigned after one successful operation.
Past Performance Does Not Guarantee Today’s Information
I learned this lesson firsthand. I was working with a productive source whose information had historically been solid. During an investigation, the CI reported having entered a residence and seeing a firearm inside. We had an independent means of reviewing activity at the location, and that review showed something important:
The source had never gone inside. That changed everything. The problem wasn’t that the source misunderstood what they saw or got a minor detail wrong. They represented firsthand knowledge of something that did not happen. Despite the quality of information the source had provided previously, I closed the source because that lie went directly to information that could influence legal process and police action.
It was difficult precisely because the CI had been productive. That experience reinforced something I believe handlers have to continually remind themselves: yesterday’s reliability does not prove today’s allegation. I have also made the opposite mistake. I have accepted information from a historically productive source without doing as much homework as I should have because the source had been right before. Handlers need to be willing to admit when that happens. Experience does not make us immune from bias. In some ways, success can make that bias more likely.
When it happens, go back to the fundamentals. Reassess the source. Reassess the information. Reassess what has changed. The CI Blueprint is a process, not a designation we give someone and forget about.
What Does the Source Actually Know?
One of the most important questions in source handling is also one of the simplest:
How do you know that? A CI saying, “John has ten pounds of meth at his house,” gives me very little by itself. I need to understand the basis of that statement.
Did the source personally see it? When? Where inside the residence? What did it look like? How was it packaged? Who else was present? What was happening when the source observed it? How does the source know the person they identified is actually John? How do they know that is John’s residence? The surrounding details matter.
Someone who was actually inside a residence can ordinarily tell you more than the single fact investigators want to hear. They may be able to describe the layout, vehicles outside, people present, damage to the property, where an item was located, or other details from the interaction. Investigators can then attempt to independently corroborate portions of that account through lawful investigative means. We may never be able to independently prove exactly what the CI saw inside a private location before seeking legal process. But we should be able to explain what reasonable steps we took to evaluate the information.
That matters operationally, legally, and professionally.
A good supervisor should be asking the handler the same question:
How do we know?
Hearsay Can Be Useful Without Being Actionable
Not every piece of information a CI provides has to be firsthand to have investigative value.
Sources hear things. They hear rumors, conversations, and information circulating within criminal networks. That information can point investigators in a direction. It can identify a person we should look at, a location worth researching, or a relationship we did not previously know existed. But investigators need to distinguish an investigative lead from information upon which they are prepared to take significant action. If a CI tells me someone else said a particular person is selling drugs, that may give me somewhere to start. It does not mean I should write the allegation as though the CI personally observed the activity.
Instead, it creates an opportunity for further collection and investigation. That distinction is important throughout CI work: information can be valuable without yet being actionable intelligence.
Corroboration Is the Homework
A large portion of a good CI operation happens before the visible operation ever begins. It happens behind a computer, in records, through surveillance, through deconfliction, and through investigators asking questions about the people, locations, vehicles, phone numbers, associations, criminal histories, and previous police contacts connected to what the CI has reported.
If a source identifies a person and an address, can we establish a connection between them? Does the vehicle information make sense? Do known associates overlap? Does the person’s criminal history support or contradict portions of what we have been told? Are there previous calls or police contacts at the location? Can lawful surveillance confirm relevant activity? No single corroborated detail necessarily proves the entire allegation. But collectively, those details begin creating a picture. Small details matter because they help us determine whether the source actually possesses the knowledge they claim to possess.
This is the homework.
And in my opinion, one of the biggest mistakes investigators make with CI information is not doing enough homework to turn information into intelligence. The investigator’s name is ultimately attached to the investigation and, when applicable, to the affidavit presented to a judge. “My CI told me” should never become a substitute for investigative work when additional verification is reasonably available.
Being Wrong Is Not Always the Same as Lying
Handlers also need to distinguish between inaccurate information and intentional deception. Confidential informants are human. They misunderstand conversations. They make assumptions. They forget details. They may receive incorrect information from other people. Some of the individuals we work with live chaotic lives involving substance abuse, criminal activity, unstable relationships, or other factors that can affect the precision of what they report.
If one fact turns out to be incorrect, I do not automatically assume everything the source has ever provided is worthless. I want to understand why it was wrong. Was the information old? Did circumstances change? Was the source estimating? Did someone lie to them? Did they misunderstand what they observed? Or did the CI knowingly lie to law enforcement?
Those are different problems.
A source intentionally lying about information that is going to influence a criminal investigation, warrant, or enforcement operation is far more concerning to me than a source being wrong about an incidental detail. The handler needs to evaluate the significance of the falsehood, confront it when appropriate, and document it. Sometimes confronting a source improves the relationship because it reinforces the boundaries established at the beginning: I will be direct with you, and I expect you to be direct with me.
But when the lie involves the case itself, the stakes change considerably. The handler is not the only person who may eventually rely upon that information. Other investigators, supervisors, prosecutors, judges, and officers involved in an operation may rely on representations originating with that source.
The handler has to remember who will ultimately be left holding that information if it is false.
The Empty Search Warrant Still Tells Us Something
The same analysis should occur when an operation does not produce what the source predicted. Suppose a CI reports a quantity of narcotics inside a residence and investigators later execute a warrant but recover substantially less—or nothing at all.
That result should trigger questions, but not necessarily an immediate conclusion. How much time passed between the CI’s observation and execution of the warrant? Was the alleged contraband something likely to be sold or consumed quickly? Could circumstances reasonably have changed?
Then consider the other possibilities. Did the source warn someone? Does the source have poor operational security? Did someone overhear something? Was the source intentionally directing investigators toward a smaller target to protect someone more important? Or was the original information simply false. Failures belong on the CI resume too.
If our documentation only memorializes the wins, we are not documenting reliability. We are documenting a highlight reel.
“Love of Source” Is a Reliability Problem
Productive sources are difficult to find. You can interview numerous potential sources before finding one who has the placement, access, motivation, reliability, and ability to consistently produce useful information. When you finally find that person, operations begin succeeding. Warrants get written. Arrests occur. Cases move.
And the handler becomes invested. I call this “love of source.” The more a CI produces, the easier it becomes to explain away warning signs because we do not want to lose the source. Their previous success begins answering questions that should still be asked about current information. I have seen it happen, and I have experienced it myself.
One of the best protections against love of source is creating an environment where other investigators and supervisors are expected to challenge the primary handler. On my team, we have discussed sources openly. I have called other investigators out, and they have called me out.
That is healthy. If your supervisor and teammates never challenge your assessment of your best source, I would argue that you probably have a blind spot somewhere.
The question should never be, “Why don’t you trust my CI?”
The question should be:
“What are we relying on to establish that this information is reliable?”
The Secondary Handler Is More Than a Witness
A secondary handler provides another set of eyes on the relationship.
After a meaningful CI meeting, I believe the primary and secondary handler should talk. What did you hear? What stood out? Did the source avoid a question? Did something sound different from a previous conversation? Do you believe the source actually possesses the access they claim? Is the primary handler overlooking something?
Those conversations can generate additional questions and better assessments.
The supervisor serves a similar function at another level. A supervisor does not need to personally handle every CI to ask good questions. Why do we believe this? What corroboration was attempted? What has this source’s history been? What information has been wrong before? Are we asking this CI to operate outside their normal placement and access?
The last question is particularly important.
Sometimes investigators become so focused on a target that they begin pushing a productive source to obtain information outside the environment where that source naturally belongs. That can degrade the quality of the information and create unnecessary risk for the CI.
A source telling you, “I can’t do that without looking suspicious,” may be providing you with extremely important information.
Listen to them.
The Intended Police Action Matters
Not every piece of CI information requires the same response.
If a source says, “You might want to look at this person,” I can treat that as a lead and begin researching. If the information is going to contribute to a search warrant, support an arrest, initiate a high-risk tactical operation, or expose the source to significant danger, the consequences are substantially different.
My level of scrutiny increases with the consequence of being wrong.
That does not mean investigators will always be able to verify everything before acting. Law enforcement sometimes operates with incomplete information, particularly when dealing with rapidly developing circumstances. But when time and investigative resources allow us to corroborate information, we should use them.
The source’s safety must also be part of that decision.
Information may be accurate and still be dangerous to act upon immediately. If enforcement action immediately following a CI’s contact would obviously expose that person as the likely source, slowing down may be the better operational decision. Investigators should consider source exposure as part of operational planning rather than treating it as an afterthought.
Producing a case is not the only objective.
We also have a responsibility to manage the risk created by how and when we use the information.
Reliability and the Law
The legal treatment of informant information depends on jurisdiction and the purpose for which the information is being used.
At the federal constitutional level, the United States Supreme Court moved away from the rigid two-prong Aguilar-Spinelli framework in Illinois v. Gates, adopting a totality-of-the-circumstances approach for evaluating probable cause based on informant information.
Washington is different. Washington courts have continued to apply the Aguilar-Spinelli analysis under Article I, Section 7 of the Washington Constitution when evaluating informant information used to establish probable cause. Generally stated, that analysis examines the informant’s basis of knowledge and veracity. Deficiencies may, depending on the circumstances and applicable case law, be addressed through appropriate independent police corroboration.
For practitioners, the legal terminology matters, but so does the underlying investigative principle.
Who is providing the information?
How do they know it?
Why should we believe them?
What did we independently verify?
And what are we asking a judge—or our own personnel—to do based upon it?
Handlers should understand the controlling law in their jurisdiction and work closely with prosecutors when CI information will support legal process. A federal standard, another state’s practice, or something a handler learned at a previous agency should not be assumed to control the current investigation.
Build the CI Resume
I believe every meaningful interaction with a source should contribute to our understanding of that person’s reliability.
Document the information that proved accurate.
Document the operations that succeeded.
Document what could be corroborated.
But also document what was wrong.
Document the warrant that did not produce what was expected. Document the inconsistency. Document the lie. Document the explanation. Document the change in behavior.
Over time, that creates something much more valuable than simply labeling a source “reliable.”
It creates a record from which the next handler, supervisor, prosecutor, or investigator can understand why the source has been considered reliable and where the weaknesses exist.
That is the CI resume.
And like suitability and motivation, it should continue developing for as long as the source remains active.
We Don’t Trust a Source
There is a reason I push back when a detective tells me they trust their CI.
The people we use as confidential informants often come from criminal environments. Many have competing loyalties, personal motivations, substance-use issues, financial pressures, pending charges, or relationships with the very people we are investigating. That does not make them useless. In many cases, those same circumstances are exactly what give them placement and access that law enforcement cannot replicate.
But our job is not to replace skepticism with trust.
Our job is to make informed decisions based on the source’s demonstrated history, the basis of their knowledge, the information available to us, and the corroboration we can reasonably obtain.
Past reliability tells me something important about the source.
It does not relieve me of the responsibility to investigate what they are telling me today.
We don’t blindly trust a source. We build a documented basis for believing—or questioning—the information they provide.
That distinction protects the investigation, the officers acting on the information, the integrity of the legal process, and ultimately the CI themselves.
References & Authorities
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
Washington Constitution, Article I, Section 7.
Additional Washington authority concerning the Aguilar-Spinelli test and corroboration should be consulted based upon the particular investigative and legal context.
About the Author
James Porter is the founder of NW Tactical Methods LLC and a law-enforcement instructor and practitioner with experience in confidential informant management, tactical operations, surveillance, ballistic shield operations, and law-enforcement training. His professional background also includes military human-intelligence operations. His work focuses on operational effectiveness, documentation, risk management, and defensible law-enforcement practices.
This article reflects the author’s professional experience and opinions and is intended for educational purposes. It is not legal advice. Agency personnel should follow applicable law, prosecutorial guidance, and their agency’s policies and procedures.